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INTRODUCTION 
Videogame developers (VGDs) and software designers (SDs) working in business-to-
business technological services (B2BTS) are highly qualified knowledge workers part of the 
bigger information technology (IT) industry (Corbeil, 2011). As such, they are marginalized in 
research on working time and overtime compensation.  
First, they earn much higher wages than average workers of comparable level of education 
(150-200% in Canada). I am focusing here on IT jobs that demand a great deal of 
knowledge, use a workforce highly specialized in the production of one-of-a-kind or 
customized goods or services, with their added value being directly related to their 
innovativeness. Mean gross weekly pay in the IT industry varies significantly; the two 
subindustries in which it was the highest in 2009 are software publishing ($1,247) and 
system consulting and design services ($1,053), compared with a mean of $724 for all 
Quebec industries (Corbeil, 2011, p. 38). The occupation with the highest mean was IT 
engineer, at $1,430 a week (Corbeil, 2011, p. 39). IT pay in Quebec rose 8% between 2008 
and 2010, that is, 2 or percentage points more than for all areas of the Quebec economy in 
the same period (Corbeil, 2011, p. 39). These recent pay increases in IT may be explained 
by the shortage of specialized workers in the field and could accelerate over the next few 
years, given the drop in registration in IT training programs (Corbeil, 2011, p. 40; ESAC, 
2011, p. 22). Furthermore, IT workers are younger on average than in most Quebec 
industries, so that their pay levels are even higher than those of the rest of the population of 
the same age.  
Second, they have also long been considered as working with great autonomy and using 
their creativity (Castells, 2000, 2001; Reich, 2002; Florida, 2002, 2005), thus occupying 
professional-managerial level jobs wherein contracts are assimilated to result-based 
contracts, while in fact matters are not that clear. Videogame industry still has maintained 
the non-conformist feel of the dotcom era and image of a hip, fun, and free culture where 
you get paid to play games (Dyer-Witheford et DePeuter, 2009; DePeuter & Dyer-Witheford, 
2005; Ross, 2003, 2009), with a work as play ethos (Deuze, Bowen et Allen, 2007; Dyer-
Witheford, 2002, 2005) where work is really playbour (Kuchlich, 2005).  
The reality is somewhat different. As creators cannot be managed with the Taylorist methods 
of the Fordist era, these workers do, of course, enjoy a certain freedom (Dyer-Witheford, 
2002). Workforce management must foster creativity by allowing a culture of individualism, 
diversity and so on (DePeuter & Dyer-Witheford, 2005; Hardt & Negri, 2000). But it must also 
encourage meritocracy, risk taking and high performance (Leadbeater, 1997).  
Highly skilled VGD and SD jobs are, in fact, full time (96%) and permanent (93%), while the 
part-time and contract jobs are in testing and manufacturing (Dumais, 2009, p. 7). These 
workers recognize the gratifying creative nature of their work, with its undeniable complexity 
and stimulation (Chasserio & Legault, 2009; IGDA, 2004, p. 12). Flexible working hours, a 
casual dress code, free meals, fitness facilities, funky interior design and relaxed 
atmosphere that accepts a twisted sense of humour and rebellious personality (DePeuter & 
Dyer-Witheford, 2005) exist, but do not tell the whole story. The industry also has a dark 
side. 
Workers face some problems and risks at work, the main one common to both being 
unlimited unpaid overtime (UUO), entailing poor work-life balance, a high incidence of 
musculoskeletal disorders and burnout and, as it is a barrier to entry, exclusion of workers 
with family responsibilities, and thus a scarcity of women (Legault & Chasserio, 2010, 2012; 
Legault & Ouellet, 2012).  
In this paper, based on 140 interviews in two successive case studies led in Montreal, I’ll 
draw on previous demonstration of the existence of UUO among VGDs and SDs, and use 
these two case studies to illustrate an emerging workplace regulation model, stemming from 
combined IT firms’ risk management strategy and project management (PM) as an 
organisation mode, closely tied to the high international mobility of both capital and 
workforce. Here I focus on (de)regulation of working time only, but it opens a path to 
theoretically account for (de)regulation of work among an expanding workforce: the “new 
professionals” in the knowledge work.  
METHOD 
The empirical material here draws on two case studies that are part of a larger research 
program I have been pursuing since 2000, to account for (de)regulation of work among an 
expanding workforce: the “new professionals” who do knowledge work, that is, non liberal 
professions that are not state-regulated or certified.  
As for the SDs, I investigated seven Montreal companies. The core sample consists of five 
small, loosely structured Business to Business technology services firms (B2BTS) and two 
IT departments of big bureaucracies (a corporate real-estate management company and an 
insurance firm) as a comparative sample.  
I conducted 88 extensive individual interviews with managers, computer analysts, 
programmer-analysts, project managers, systems analysts, systems architects, testing 
engineers, software designers, optical engineers, process engineers, operating engineers, 
optics-photonics researchers, and IT engineers. The data were collected between January 
2001 and April 2002. To make things simple, we refer to them all as software designers 
(SDs). 
In each company, we interviewed the HR manager, one or two project managers, and ten to 
twelve IT experts, virtually equal numbers of women (45) and men (43). In our sample of 88 
respondents, the average age for men and women was around 35 years old. A proportion of 
60% of our respondents had a university degree and 26% had a technical college diploma.  
Our respondents were chosen randomly from the lists provided by the HR manager. The in-
depth interviews lasted one and a half to two hours, and the interview guide was semi 
structured. Everyone was asked certain standard questions, so simple descriptive statistics 
can be summed up, though the study was qualitative.  
To draw up a profile of VGDs in Quebec, I investigated 4 big on-line or console game studios 
in Montreal. I interviewed 53 designers: producers (project managers) or associate 
producers, game or level designers, programmers, sound designers, 2D or 3D artists, 
modellers or animators; some were ‘leads’ (team leaders) or support employees for 
designers in each of these areas. We excluded senior managers and managerial staff who 
are not subject to the provisions regarding payment of overtime hours [Quebec Act 
respecting labour standards, sec. 54(3)]. The data were collected during the summer 2008. 
Each of the big studios has between 300 and 2,000 employees. Our sample consists of 
equal numbers of men and women, despite the low proportion of female workers in the 
industry (Legault, 2005, 2006). We make no claims about statistical representativity, as our 
aim in establishing the sample was to help us understand the low numbers of women in the 
sector.  
We recruited our respondents by word of mouth, to begin with, and then by using the 
snowball method (asking respondents to refer other potential respondents to us), as well as 
by posting notices on the International Game Developers Association (IGDA) website and by 
soliciting respondents during IGDA social activities. 
The VGDs are well educated: 98% of them have completed some form of post-secondary 
education, whether a diploma from a junior college or specialized private institute, a 
university certificate, or a bachelor’s degree or master’s degree. The breakdown of 
respondents by level of education (highest level attained) is shown in Table 1.  
The two samples are from Montreal because close to 90% of the economic value of IT in 
Quebec as a share of GDP (as well as 68% of companies) is provided by business-to-
business services (including software products), 85% of which are located in the greater 
Montreal and Quebec City areas (Corbeil, 2011, p. 8).  
UNLIMITED UNPAID OVERTIME IN IT - SALIENT FACTS 
Overtime among SDS 
Long working hours are a common characteristic of companies that practice PM and employ 
highly skilled workers (Chasserio & Legault, 2005, 2010; IGDA, 2004: 30; Gale & Cartwright, 
1995; Lapointe, 2005; Legault, 2005; Perrons, 2003; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2000).  
Among the respondents in both the B2BTS companies and the IT departments of the two 
large bureaucracies I investigated in 2001-2, employees put in overtime hours at home in the 
evening or on weekends. As these results have been published yet, I’ll just briefly recall that 
14 out of 45 women and 27 out of 43 men bring work home in the evening, after the 
workday; 46% of the women and 83% of the men regularly put in a significant number of 
overtime hours (Chasserio & Legault, 2005): 49% of our respondents work over 40 hours a 
week (40% of the women and 58% of the men) and 13.6% over 50 hours a week (6.6% of 
women and 20% of men). Only very rarely are these overtime hours paid or compensated by 
time off (Chasserio & Legault, 2005; Legault & Chasserio, 2003).  
These findings about working hours reveal major differences between men and women. We 
can remark that women work less in overtime compared to their male colleagues. This 
difference can be explained by women still being primarily responsible for childcare (Benoît, 
2006, Legault & Chasserio, 2006). Working overtime, whether at the office or at home, is a 
form of commitment behavior (Tremblay & Wils, 2005: 43), and one that is very 
advantageous for the employer when it is unpaid (Legault & Chasserio, 2003). 
These professionals set no limits on their availability — especially for answering calls from 
customers — and consider it to be part and parcel of their job. For instance, four women and 
six men wear a pager even at night. The following expressions keep coming up in their 
explanations: “You have to be available 24 hours a day,” “Be available day and night,” “You 
always have to say yes, agree to do anything,” “Respond to the needs of users and 
customers.” Moreover, project managers assess their employees’ commitment to the 
company on the basis of their availability to respond to customers, which becomes a key 
point in promotion, reputation and mobility (Legault & Chasserio, 2003). 
Crunch time among VGDs 
In an earlier publication (Legault & Ouellet, 2012), I discussed the problem of overtime 
revealed by a survey conducted in Montreal. I will not repeat those published findings, but I 
would like to recall some of the highlights. Overtime hours are long, frequent and unpaid. 
Underestimated for decades, the problem of crunch time and associated burnout has now 
been documented (DePeuter & Dyer-Witheford, 2005; Dyer-Witheford & Sharman, 2005, 
pp. 203-4; Dyer-Witheford & DePeuter, 2006, pp. 607-12; IGDA, 2004). Theoretically, 
designers are asked to work evenings and weekends as a game shipping deadline 
approaches, or at an important milestone for presenting progress on a game to a publisher 
(IGDA, 2004, p. 13) to continue to receive funding. In practice, however, overtime is more 
the rule than the exception, according to a 2004 online Quality of Life International Survey of 
994 members of the International Game Developers Association (IGDA, 2004), amounting to 
10% of its members.  
According to data from the 2009 Quality of Life international survey1
Overtime is actually used as much preventively as out of necessity because the uncertainty 
inherent in the process of getting out an original product, which cannot be planned ahead, 
forces managers to take precautions. I will come back to this later. In Quebec, this 
devastating tendency considerably harms the industry, in which 47% of studios have 
problems of recruiting (Beauchamp, 2010, p. 4) and many have trouble holding on to their 
creators (IGDA, 2004, p. 21; Chung, 2005). 
, almost half of the 
sample (N=1943) receive no compensation for crunch. Nine percent receive overtime pay, 
20% get time off, 15% receive perks during crunch and 13% receive a bonus.  
Long working hours and unlimited and unpaid overtime are a paramount problem in the 
trade (IGDA, 2004). In Québec, where our interviews took place, the Act respecting labour 
standards (RSQ, ch. N-1.1, sec. 52-55) clearly states that an employer who explicitly asks 
an employee to work overtime must pay for the overtime hours at premium rate; conversely, 
if the employer does not want to pay for the overtime, he cannot require an employee to 
work it. Still, studios’ practices are legally ambiguous because managers and supervisors do 
not actually ask designers to work overtime. They claim that overtime is never compulsory, 
but that developers do it on their own initiative. Some of our interview respondents did refuse 
to work overtime; however, they usually end up having to limit their career ambitions as a 
result. While some developers are compensated for these ‘willingly worked’ overtime hours 
based on a bonus system and compensatory free time, compensation is never guaranteed. 
Moreover, when they are compensated, it is only in part, and its level is uncertain and 
discretionary, the proportion of hours for which compensation is granted is haphazard. The 
way overtime is managed is a source of significant dissatisfaction. As with SDs, it must be 
acknowledged as a factor in the underrepresentation of women in the industry.  
As a result, in the industry, the existence of overtime is more or less denied. This starts with 
the use of the term crunch time instead of overtime. It continues with the fact that designers 
are never actually required to work overtime. Project managers note the project’s needs, ask 
                                            
1  Johanna Weststar and I are in the process of analysing these data for IGDA; they should be soon published on 
association’s website.  
designers to do overtime or attempt to make them want to do it, mentioning the possibility of 
two forms of compensation (bonus and time off in lieu), and in the end, the designers decide 
to stay at work on their own initiative. The Act Respecting Labour Standards excludes some 
employees from its benefits, especially senior managerial personnel [s. 3(6)] and other 
managerial personnel who are not subject to the provisions governing payment of overtime 
[s. 54(3)]. With the exception of game designers who have this status, most industry 
employees could be covered by the definition of employees to whom the act applies. 
Counting overtime would mean admitting that it exists, which, incidentally, is a breach of the 
Act Respecting Labour Standards if not paid at a premimum rate. So in the studios where 
our respondents work, no overtime records are kept.  
Hence the question: If designers are not paid for working overtime, why are they so willing to 
do it? I will come back to this later. 
BROADER DEREGULATION OF WORKING TIME: SALIENT FACTS 
Increasing unlimited unpaid overtime in the Western world as in 
Québec  
Traditionally the preserve of men, especially managers and professionals (Bouffartigue & 
Bouteiller, 2001; Boulin & Plasman, 1997; Johnson, Lero & Rooney, 2001), voluntary unpaid 
overtime has been increasing since the ’80s and expanding into new job categories, 
including highly skilled (the so-called new professions, acknowledged but unprotected and 
uncertified) or intermediate service jobs (Campbell, 2002a, p. 96).  
Although there is a general long-term trend toward shortening the regular workweek and 
reducing extreme schedules, which might give the impression that the problem is a minor 
one (Campbell, 2002b, p. 122; Usalcas, 2008), there is great diversity, even polarization, in 
working hours (Hall, 1999; Lapointe, 2005), and some groups are affected by an opposite 
trend: a longer workweek and unpaid overtime.  
This can be seen in many industrialized countries and yet the issue has scarcely been 
touched on by North American researchers, although it has been studied elsewhere since 
1990: Australia (Burgess, 1998; Campbell, 1997, 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Gale, 1999; Healy, 
2000; Pocock, 2001; Pocock, Van Wanrooy, Strazzari & Bridge, 2001; Wooden, 2001a, 
2001b), the United Kingdom (Bell & Hart, 1999; Fagan, 2001; Fagan & Lallement, 2000; 
Harkness, 1999; Rubery, 1998), Scandinavia (Aronsson, 1999; Julkunen and Nätti, 1999), 
Germany (Anger, 2004; Bell, Hart, Hübler & Schwerdt, 2000; Croucher & Singe, 2003) and 
Japan (Mizunoya, 2001).  
There are a number of constants: 
– Unpaid overtime is increasing and exceeds paid overtime worked (Campbell, 2002b, 
pp. 118-21); the increase in unpaid overtime is even the primary factor in the extension of 
working hours in Australia, outstripping paid overtime and the regular workweek 
(Campbell, 2002b, p. 121). 
– Unpaid overtime is more common among men, managers and professionals (Aronsson, 
1999; Campbell, 2002b, p. 112-116); 40% of respondents to Statistics Sweden’s regular 
Work Environment Study reported it. More men work overtime, in part because more 
men work full time.  
– Blue-collar workers (in manufacturing) are much better protected than highly skilled 
white-collar workers, who do more overtime (Campbell, 2002b, p. 113). Blue collars are 
generally paid for overtime. 
– More and more highly skilled white-collar workers are affected: middle managers, 
accountants, IT workers, teachers, health-care professionals, technicians (Campbell, 
2002b, pp. 130–1; Healy, 2000). 
– In fact, overtime has been studied more among full-time workers, about whom precise 
data can be obtained. Very few part-time workers report working overtime, both because 
they work less overtime and because when they do, they do not interpret it as such 
(Campbell, 2002b, pp. 111 and 147). 
Canada is no exception: 
About one in five employees in Canada works overtime, averaging about nine extra 
hours per week. Only about half of these employees are compensated with overtime pay. 
That means potentially one in ten Canadian employees are working unpaid overtime 
hours. This represents over C$15 billion in potential claims for unpaid overtime every 
year, just at straight time. At time and a half, this is more than C$22.5 billion. Relatively 
few individual employees make claims for unpaid overtime. With the recent proliferation 
of class action lawsuits for unpaid overtime, however, the risk of claims encompassing a 
significant proportion of that liability is growing (Rousseau, 2009).  
According to Statistics Canada, of the 2.9 million Canadians who worked overtime in 2008, 
11.4% were not paid at all for it (Conference Board, 2009). Over 1.6 million Canadians 
worked an average of 8.4 hours of unpaid overtime per week (Statistics Canada, 2008a, 
2008b). According to 90% of employers surveyed by the Conference Board (2009), the 
issues of legal action or complaints involving unpaid overtime are set to become extremely 
important in the near future. A number of employers are facing class actions in common law 
courts; KPMG had to pay out $10 million in compensation, and in the banking industry, there 
are several lawsuits and class actions in progress: 
Many employers in Canada have a 37.5 or 35-hour contractual work week standard with 
their employees, including municipalities and the financial sector for example. The 
financial sector is also where we are seeing the first major class action lawsuits on 
unpaid overtime in Canada, with employees claiming years of unpaid overtime worked at 
CIBC, Scotiabank and KPMG. Employees routinely worked up to 90 hours a week 
according to the recent lawsuit against KPMG and were “pushed out” by the employer if 
they tried to claim compensation for the overtime (Pereira, 2009, p. 19-20).  
The Quebec labour force as a whole worked 36.4 unpaid overtime hours in 2010, with men 
doing 40.5 and women 32.3. The same population worked 34.1 paid overtime hours in 2010, 
with men doing 47.8 and women 20.4 (ISQ, 2011, p. 254).  
On the other hand, between 2000 and 2010, the regular number of hours put in by full-time 
workers declined slightly, from 38.7 to 38 hours per week, and the proportion who worked 
41 hours or more per week dropped from 11% to 6.1% (ISQ, 2011, p. 237). Even in the 
private sector, the proportion who worked 41 hours or more per week dropped from 10.9% to 
5.8% (ISQ, 2011, p. 245). During this same period, there were still more men than women 
working 41 hours or more per week, although the numbers went down for both sexes: from 
14.2% to 8% for men and from 3.6% to 1.9% for women. For the entire working population, 
both sexes, it declined from 9.2% to 4.9% (ISQ, 2011, p. 231).  
In Canada in 2007, over 22.6% of employees worked overtime, either paid or not. They were 
more likely to be unpaid (11.4%) than paid (10.4%) (Statistics Canada, Labour Force 
Survey, CANSIM table 282-0084). 
It is a popular misconception that professionals are not protected by law because they are 
compensated by a flat fee or on an annual basis. IT firms come under provincial jurisdiction. 
In Quebec, professionals and non-senior managers are not, however, excluded from the 
application of the Act Respecting Labour Standards, despite a widespread belief that only 
hourly employees are entitled to be paid extra for overtime: 
44.75% of organizations said their non-management, salaried employees are expected 
to work overtime without pay. Whether an employee is paid on an hourly or salary basis 
is not criteria for overtime entitlement. Salaried employees have the same entitlement to 
overtime as hourly employees. Salary versus hourly pay are merely methods by which 
wages are paid and affect how the entitlement to overtime is calculated, not whether it 
exists (Rousseau, 2009).  
In North America, employers are regularly sued and ordered to compensate employees 
claiming payment for overtime and in Canada, law firms are sounding the alarm (Rousseau, 
2009). The State does not intervene to prevent violations of existing laws (by means of 
inspections, fines or public awareness campaigns) or to regulate situations where laws allow 
workers to be exempted from overtime pay (Pereira, 2009, pp. 4-5):  
Workers may not complain because they are ignorant of their rights under Part III, 
because they fear employer reprisals, or because they lack the stamina or means to 
pursue their remedies. (Arthurs, 2006, p. 220). Workers are so concerned that they will 
be fired that they abandon their statutory rights (Arthurs, 2006, p. 192-3).  
Provincial enforcement [of labour legislation in the areas of hours of work, vacation, 
unjust dismissal and reprisals against employees, and overtime pay] has been 
essentially non-existent, with companies having a less than 1 % chance of ever being 
inspected for labour violations, and almost no possibility of being fined or prosecuted 
even when they are found to be in violation of provincial labour law in Canada’s most 
populous province, Ontario. Even if federal legislation was enforced, the recent federal 
commission into the matter has called the penalties against employers who violate labour 
laws “derisory” and a “virtual license fee” for doing so. We are thus left with a culture of 
labour violations in Canada, as there is no penalty or virtually no penalty for violating 
workers’ rights and dignity (Pereira, 2009, p. 72-3).  
Considering how much research has been done on paid overtime among North American 
academics, scant research on UUO is remarkable; some studies of overtime fail to 
distinguish between paid and unpaid overtime, as if it did not matter (Pereira, 2009, p. 6). 
The North American and Canadian public opinion has reacted much less strongly to unpaid 
overtime than has been the case in Australia, the UK, Ireland, Spain or Italy (Pereira, 2009, 
pp. 4-6).  
In short, there is a general declining trend in unpaid overtime, and that may be one reason 
for the lack of interest. Nevertheless, some specific fields are more affected, as knowledge 
work, and no matter how few workers there may be in relation to the entire labour force, the 
costs to employers may be considerable.  
En 1998, Chez les gestionnaires canadiens, 40 % travaillaient plus de 40 heures par 
semaine en 1998; parmi eux, 14 % travaillent entre 40 et 60 heures et 8 % travaillent plus de 
60 heures. Chez les professionnels, 25 % travaillent plus de 40 heures par semaine (Hall, 
1999, p. 33). Ils sont nombreux à le faire sans rémunération : 29 % des gestionnaires et 
23 % des professionnels en 1998. Chez les gestionnaires, 8 % travaillent 15 heures ou plus 
en heures supplémentaires non rémunérées et 8 % en travaillent 10 à 14 heures. Chez les 
professionnels, 6 % travaillent 15 heures ou plus en heures supplémentaires non 
rémunérées et 6 % en travaillent 10 à 14 heures. Par comparaison, chez les travailleurs de 
la production manufacturière et des métiers, moins de 3 % travaillent en heures 
supplémentaires non rémunérées (Hall, 1999, p. 35-6). Dans l’ensemble des travailleurs, 
8 % des travailleurs travaillaient en heures supplémentaires rémunérées, pendant que 10 % 
n’étaient pas rémunérés pour le faire (de même en 2000, selon Statistique Canada, 2001). 
Ceux qui ne sont pas rémunérés pour les heures supplémentaires consenties sont 
légèrement plus nombreux (4 %) à travailler 10 heures supplémentaires et plus par semaine 
que ceux qui sont rémunérés pour le faire (3 %). Les hommes sont plus nombreux (11 %) à 
les consentir que les femmes (6 %) et en travaillent plus (Hall, 1999, p. 34).  
Au Canada, la situation est différente; en vertu de la partie III du Code canadien du travail 
(LC, c. L-2), qui contient les dispositions concernant les heures supplémentaires, les 
dispositions portant sur les heures de travail ne s'appliquent pas au personnel de direction et 
de gestion, ni aux autres employés qui assument des fonctions de gestion, ni aux membres 
du groupe professionnel : architectes, dentistes, ingénieurs, avocats et médecins. Les SDs, 
s’ils travaillaient dans des entreprises de compétence canadienne, seraient donc protégés. 
De toutes façons, ces dispositions sont relativement impuissantes à protéger les travailleurs 
assujettis, car les instances étatiques qui peuvent poursuivre un employeur délinquant ne 
l’ont jamais fait depuis 1987 :  et au qc?appeler Gesualdi 
Importance of unpaid overtime in knowledge work in general and 
IT in particular 
The IT industry is part of the knowledge economy, which also includes VGDs under the 
banner of the multimedia and SD industry (Corbeil, 2011, p. 40). As such, the trend toward 
more unpaid overtime is important because employment in the knowledge economy is set to 
expand (Chartrand-Beauregard & Gingras, 2005).  
The skill level required for IT jobs in Quebec is evidence of the degree of sophistication of 
jobs in the industry: close to 50% require a university education and 40% a college diploma. 
Almost all other jobs require a managerial profile (Corbeil, 2011, p. 8).  
In Quebec in 2010, total hours worked were proportionate to education: university graduates 
worked an average of 121 hours overtime per year, while college graduates worked 61.2, 
high school graduates 49.8 and those without a high-school diploma 41.1. This overtime is 
much less often paid than in other occupational categories. University graduates work 99 
hours of unpaid overtime per year, college graduates 22.6 and others even fewer (ISQ, 
2011, p. 254). On the other hand, between 2000 and 2010, there was no general increase in 
working hours among university graduates: the regular workweek declined from 35.8 hours 
to 35.1 and the proportion of workers with this level of education who worked 41 or more 
hours per week went from 8.8% to 4.1% (ISQ, 2011, p. 235).  
Among various types of jobs, in 2010, teaching ranked first, with 109 hours of unpaid 
overtime, followed by professional, scientific and technical services (which include the jobs in 
question here), with 69 hours a year (ISQ, 2011, p. 258). On the other hand, between 2000 
and 2010, there was no general increase in working hours in professional, scientific and 
technical services: the regular workweek slipped from 36.5 hours to 36.2 (ISQ, 2011, 
p. 250).  
This question is important because it is estimated that about 20% of jobs in Quebec, Ontario 
and Canada as a whole require a high degree of skill, and this proportion is increasing 
because half of new jobs are of that type (Chartrand-Beauregard & Gingras, 2005, pp. 5–6). 
This category covers industries that do a lot of R&D, use a large proportion of scientists and 
high-tech, typically have a preponderance of intangible assets, have jobs that demand a 
great deal of knowledge and use a workforce highly specialized in the production of one-of-
a-kind or customized goods or services, with their added value being directly related to their 
innovativeness (Chartrand-Beauregard & Gingras, 2005, p. 2).  
In 2009, Quebec accounted for 23% of all Canadian IT jobs, as opposed to 50% in Ontario 
and 12% in British Columbia (Corbeil, 2011, p. 17). In the rest of Canada, as in Quebec, 
specialized services of the type under discussion here generate the largest proportion of the 
IT industry’s total earnings: 60% in Canada, 90% in Québec (as well as 68% of companies) 
(Corbeil, 2011, p. 8). All these specialized services account for 79% of IT jobs in Quebec. 
System consulting and design services, in particular, provide the most jobs: over 70,000 
(47% of total) (Corbeil, 2011, p. 23). Only 10% of the value of the industry derives from the 
manufacture of hardware, equipment and accessories that do not involve knowledge work. 
In the international value chain, in fact, most manufacturing is now being done in the Asia-
Pacific region, which takes in over 50% of revenue in the global IT hardware and equipment 
industry (Corbeil, 2011, p. 29).  
Moreover, internationally, software and services are leading IT industry growth, which is 
expected to be about 8.5% annually between 2009 and 2014 in the Americas and Europe. 
Over 40% of revenue in the global software and services industry is in the Americas. Private 
research firms all predict a boom in the West in the prosperous gaming industry (Androvich, 
2008), despite looming threats of outsourcing to countries with cheaper labour (Dyer-
Witheford & DePeuter, 2009; Dyer-Witheford, 2005). Total revenue will exceed $60 billion 
and is increasing faster than that of the film and music industry. It is thought that very soon, 
the VG industry will dominate all of the other entertainment industries in terms of sales 
(Fahey, 2005).  
The same is true in Canada,2
In short, by virtue of the IT industry’s significance in terms of jobs and anticipated growth, the 
economic importance of the subsectors in the industry and government support for them, it is 
essential to keep track of how working hours in the industry are regulated, as the model 
could help explain not just the two subsectors studied, but also others in the knowledge 
economy.  
 where studio revenue is outstripped only by that of the film and 
television industry and book publishing (Dyer-Witheford, 2005). The Canadian government 
heavily supports the industry, and the Quebec government even more, chiefly by means of 
tax breaks for companies that create a large number of jobs, as a reesult of which the 
government is thought to fund up to a quarter of game production costs. In the rest of 
Canada, studios may also enjoy federal tax breaks for R&D (Alliance NumériCQ, 2003, 
2008). Some 16,000 people are employed by the Canadian industry, which now ranks third 
in the world in terms of jobs (after the United States and Japan), contributing $1.7 billion in 
retail sales, and half of all those jobs are in Quebec (ESAC, 2011, pp. 6–12).  
                                            
2. Like Dyer-Witheford (2005), quoted here, I define the Canadian VG industry as all studios operating in Canada, 
rather than just those that are Canadian-owned.  
THE EMERGING WORKPLACE REGULATION MODEL 
PROPOSED  
High level of risk 
B2BTS firms and VG design studios are emblematic of what is known as the post-Fordist 
work organization of the knowledge economy. These two types of firms make original, one-
of-a-kind products, with rapidly changing technology and highly qualified employees, for a 
market constantly seeking something new. The design of each product (custom software or 
application, maintenance service, game) gives rise to a contract that becomes a project, 
managed according to PM body of knowledge (PMBoK) principles, bringing together experts 
selected for the specific purposes of the object to be designed. At the end of each project, 
the team breaks up and the experts are free to work on other projects, either with the same 
employer or a competitor.  
When the project contract is signed, it is just as hard to predict how long it will take, or the 
means and resources that will be needed, as it is to predict the product’s commercial 
success, because it is one of a kind and completely original. The production process is hard 
to plan and the uncertainty common to all innovative projects is huge. Such is the financial 
risk as a consequence.  
Budget conditions, deadlines and scope of the order are the key issues in risk, well-known 
as the iron triangle of PM: if the first two are too restrictive with regard to the third, they could 
lead to project failure. Among the main sources of uncertainty and risk is certainly the ghost 
of “failing to ship” or deliver (a game, a program, a website, a software package, etc.) on 
time and budget, whatever the constraints attached to the evolutional scope of the order may 
be. In the many post-mortems of failed projects posted on the Web and devoured by industry 
players, the key to a project’s failure is generally found to lie in some combination of these 
conditions (IGDA, 2004, p. 31).  
Elles sont d’abord définies dans chacun des contrats, négociés dans des conditions de 
grande compétition. Les concepteurs n’interviennent pas à ce stade du processus, mais 
devront exécuter la commande en respectant les conditions prévues ou les nouvelles 
conditions renégociées, le cas échéant. En d’autres termes, les ressources qu’on peut 
allouer au projet sont préétablies sur la foi d’un processus estimé à l’avance; si la production 
réelle en exige de nouvelles, il faut les renégocier ou s’en passer. 
Pire, ces trois conditions ne sont pas établies définitivement au démarrage, mais peuvent 
toujours être renégociées en cours de route.  
 
In the B2BTS industry, client companies and consulting firms enter into a direct relationship 
on a very competitive market. As in the VG industry, the competition is international because 
it does not matter where the good or service is produced. As there are many bidders, 
competition forces them to trim their profit margins, and their positions on the market are 
insecure and changeable.  
According to the Standish Chaos report (2009), in 2009, software projects still face 
uncertainty: 
- 32% were successful (on Time, on Budget, fully functional); 
- 44% are challenged (late, over budget, and/or less than promised functionality); 
- and 24% failed (canceled or never used). 
Reports 2006 and 2004 showed similar performances. When the true costs are added up, in 
as many as 80% of software projects, the costs are underestimated and the benefits are 
overestimated. Among the main IT projects failure factors identified by project managers, 
first two were missed deadlines (75% of failed projects) and exceeded budgets (55 %) 
(Dosani, 2001).  
In the VG industry, the risk of commercial failure is very high; the publisher has no 
assurances that the game will be a hit with consumers (ESAC, 2011, p. 22). Failures are 
much more common: 
Game budgets skyrocket, but fewer than 5% of development projects actually break even 
once they reach the marketplace. [...] If the game fails to sell at a healthy pace during the 
4-6 weeks following its release, retailers will quickly pull it from the shelves and replace it 
with something new. For a developer who has spent years working long hours and 
investing a great deal of himself or herself in a game, seeing it vanish from the market 
with barely a whimper is a depressing experience to say the least. [...] For a game, 
purchase opportunities are much more modest [than they are for movies] (IGDA, 2004, 
p. 22). 
It is a well-known fact that a very small proportion of games published become 
successful in the marketplace. In 1999, fewer than 3% of PC games available on the 
market, and about 12% of console titles, sold more than 100,000 copies – a figure that is 
itself often far below the breakeven point (IGDA, 2004, p. 42). 
Traditionally sheltered under the relatively low cost of manufacturing and R&D in software 
(as compared to industries such as pharmaceuticals or oil and gas exploration), IT sector 
now faces a more challenging landscape, as technology advances ever faster, the risk of 
having your product illegally distributed increases, copycat competitors replicate functionality 
at a lower price, timelines are lightning fast and significantly more software companies are 
investing in risk analysis; indeed, the majority of commercial games do not produce profit 
(Bethke, 2003).  
A project can take up to three years and employ anywhere from a few designers up to 200. 
Scale can vary almost infinitely: a project can cost between $5 and $20 million, or even up to 
$40 million, and at this level of investment, the pressure is enormous, because a million 
copies have to be sold just to break even (Dyer-Witheford, 2005; Shumacher, 2006, p. 147). 
The competition is fierce because along with big studios all over the world, there are also 
swarms of small, amazingly creative independent designers: 101 microstudios with up to 5 
employees, and 149 with between 6 and 50 employees (ESAC, 2011, p. 9).  
The high risks are assumed by the design studios and small independent designers because 
game publishers—the industry giants—are very averse to risk: 
Publishers point out that they face the “90:10” dilemma of a hit driven business; 10% of 
the games make 90% of the money, and they must contract developers knowing most 
games sink without a trace. [...] But, as in other cultural sectors, while the number of 
‘independent’ production companies grows, these “absorb high product risks and labour 
costs for the giants, which maintain their control over the critical areas of finance and 
distribution” (Dyer-Witheford, 2005).  
The VG industry is multinational and dominated by a few big console manufacturers 
(Microsoft, Sony, Nintendo) and a handful of big game publishers [Electronic Arts (EA), 
Activision, Konami, Ubisoft, Take Two Interactive (T2I), Toy HeadQuarters (THQ)], which 
protect themselves against risk by exercising strong control over design studios. Like a book 
publisher, a game publisher acquires the intellectual property (IP) rights to games that it 
thinks are promising and pays for them based on a licensing system under which the 
designer (studio or freelance designer) is compensated chiefly by an advance against 
royalties, which depend on retail sales. The publisher retains exclusive intellectual property 
rights to distribute and market the game and its franchise. Publisher's company may also 
own the developer's company or it may have internal development studio(s), as is Ubisoft. 
Mainstream games are normally funded by a publisher and take several years to develop. 
First, in pre-production, pitches, prototypes, and game design documents are written. If the 
idea is approved, the developer receives funding and development begins. Because the 
publisher usually finances development, it usually tries to manage development risk with a 
staff of producers (project managers) to monitor the progress of the developer, critique 
ongoing development, assist as necessary and pay when the developer reaches certain 
stages of development, called milestones (Chandler, 2009; McGuire & Jenkins, 2009). 
Funding of young IT industry comes from venture capitalists who typically select ventures 
with exceptionally high growth potential within a short timeframe (typically 3 to 7 years). In 
Quebec, IT is the R&D-driven industry that attracts the greatest share (46.2%) of venture 
capital, surpassing the health-care industry between 2008 and 2011 (Corbeil, 2011, p. 25).  
Venture capital comes with a built-in shareholders approach, as equity owners very likely call 
for a business model that allows for such a growth (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 
1984; Friedman & Miles, 2002). Any form of stakeholders’ approach of management cannot 
figure on these firms’ agenda. As labour is the utmost cost in knowledge work, the human 
resources management (HRM) approach must align with the business model and contribute 
to contain risk rather than increasing its threat and pressure on return rate. At best, HRM 
approach should contribute to keep governmental bodies, political groups, trade associations 
and the public as well at bay and union avoidance strategies are commonplace in IT sector 
(Legault & Weststar, 201*). PM offers a fit HRM approach to meet these requirements.  
How can social theory account for the contemporary trend of rising UUO in this highly risky 
venture sector? Without pretending to account for the whole issue, I however hold that two 
case studies among knowledge work in IT sector lead us to observe an emerging workplace 
regulation model among the highly qualified experts of IT, stemming from combined IT firms’ 
risk management strategy and PM as an organisation mode, and closely tied to the high 
international mobility of both capital and workforce.  
PM as a fit mode of organisation  
A bureaucratic organization lends itself poorly to creativity and innovation. The creation and 
production of customized innovative services or products, the handling of constantly 
changing orders, the satisfaction of clients with fast-changing needs, and the supervision of 
a highly skilled workforce do not lend itself to detailed operational planning, require a 
different sort of management than the mass production of goods or provision of standardized 
services and a great deal of improvisation (Packendorff, 1995). However, though creators’ 
autonomy is needed for innovation, it leads to tension with control over work, a control made 
even more necessary by the fact that the production of deliverables is often constrained by a 
limited budget and a tight timetable (Appay, 2005; Lapayre, 2009; Sydow, Lindkvist & 
DeFilippi, 2004, p. 1476). These organizations are characterized by great competition and 
short-time planning horizons due to a changing and mobile demand, an economic context 
conducive to rationalization: decentralization, delayering, accountability to shareholders and 
control of cost, the main one being labour. The challenge for managers is to abandon direct 
hierarchical control in order to preserve a climate of creativity and innovation, while at the 
same time satisfying volatile clients in a very competitive market (O’Dell and Grayson, 1998; 
Sewell, 1998, p. 408).  
The mode of organization best suited to creativity and innovation allows experts a certain 
leeway, while maintaining enough control to reduce uncertainty (Fournier, 1999, p. 292). A 
postbureaucratic mode of organization is called for (Clegg & Courpasson, 2004; Fournier, 
1999; Hodgson, 2004), and PM fits the bill. PM offers a range of means to organize and 
manage a discontinuous process, and flexible, fluid roles that can adapt quickly to changes 
in the planning without sacrificing control over the work, predictability, and experts’ discipline 
(Hodgson, 2004, p. 86). PM, despite the claims of autonomy and self determination at work 
of creative experts, sets up fairly tight controls through Work breakdown structure (WBS), 
management of the self and the importance of reputation (Legault & Chasserio, 2012).  
Among other things, the PMBoK defines stages in a project and then characterizes the 
success factors of each. This calculability and predictability is made possible by the 
delineation of a generic model for the process of project work, which is commonly defined as 
the Project Life Cycle (PLC). The PLC is effectively the cornerstone of PM, representing a 
standardized model of the stages of a project said to represent the ‘natural and pervasive 
order of thought and action.’ (Cleland & King, 1975, p. 186). At the design stage, the client 
defines what he or she wants; at the next stage—feasibility—production of the good or 
service is broken down into operations, which are checked with the client. In the 
development stage, the required means, resources, and responsibilities are determined, and 
this leads to a work breakdown structure (WBS), which can be used for control in a variety of 
ways. Coordination of the project as a whole requires frequent adjustments to planning 
(Hodgson, 2002, pp. 810-1). All decision making in these stages leading up to 
implementation involves the client and management alone; the IT experts are consulted to 
varying degrees solely with respect to estimating prerequisites, needs, time, or the prices of 
various aspects of the order. By the end of negotiations, the price, deadline, and quality of 
deliverables—the key risk factors in every project—are set down in a contract. PM sets up a 
context where every production is governed by a contract that determines the conditions of 
the iron triangle. The PM form of organization does not just allow to controlling people, it 
gives the client that control, as well.  
It is only later that IT experts enter the picture, tasked with filling the order. That is when 
worker discipline and control becomes very important, because the many microdecisions to 
be made as work progresses are so many opportunities to deviate from the overall plan 
(Hodgson, 2004, p. 87). PM thus claims to meet the challenge of managing attitudes and 
behaviours so that they are consistent with the goal, thus avoiding the risk that decisions 
made by independent people might compromise the overall result and promoting “The 
emergence of a utopian organizational form ‘in which everyone takes responsibility for the 
success of the whole’” (Heckscher & Donnellon, 1994, p. 24).  
For example, team members in both case studies often find themselves having to make 
decisions or choices for which the client must be consulted. Members of a team responsible 
for implementing software in three months had to resolve conflicts on a daily basis and make 
logistical decisions that invariably had a crucial impact on the project’s success or failure 
and, ultimately, on risk. In one instance, they had to decide whether it was better to sacrifice 
a test phase in order to meet a deadline, and thus risk releasing a product with bugs, or to 
put quality first by taking their time and risk trying the client’s patience by running late. The 
client has the upper hand in such negotiations, owing to the strong competition that pits 
B2BTS firms against others from all over the world (Alvesson, 2000; Anderson-Gough, Grey, 
& Robson, 2000).  
Workers interviewed in both case studies were assigned to the production of services, but 
never involved in negotiating contracts in which budgets and deadlines are set. They have to 
comply with these conditions as far as possible, however. SDs have a certain degree of 
autonomy, not merely by virtue of their specialized, hermetic knowledge, but by virtue of the 
fact that they deal with the client as if they were independent contractors. Their autonomy is 
first and foremost operational, that is, it is limited to deciding how to achieve a very precise 
short-term goal, within the stringent constraints of the contract. Like that of contractors, their 
autonomy is actually relative and limited much more by the client than by superiors.  
Planned to avoid the flaws of bureaucracy, the project team is the basic unit where all of the 
usual managerial functions (production, research and development, marketing, human 
resources, finance, etc.) are coordinated, whereas the same functions are separated and 
specialized in a bureaucratic context. Project managers control all of these aspects, 
including HRM where project managers really have a free hand on politics and practices in 
general and on asking people to work overtime in particular (Chasserio & Legault, 2005). But 
this must not mistake the observer: In this organisation mode, the power of the client is 
overwhelming and so much project managers’ as team members’ assessment rests on his 
satisfaction. In B2BTS, its representatives do not limit their impact to occasional requests but 
actually establish the organization’s framework for in-house production and wield numerous 
decision-making powers that in other settings are normally within the purview of the HR 
department: hiring, discipline, vacations, holidays, schedules, even firing. Project manager is 
essentially relieving the demands of the client. B2BTS firms may have a few HR policies, but 
the HR department plays a very unobtrusive role, does not intervene in the relationships 
between project managers and employees, and gives the former a great deal of latitude in 
applying HR policies (Anderson-Gough, Grey & Robson, 2000; Chasserio & Legault, 2005; 
Legault & Chasserio, 2009; Legault & Bellemare, 2008).  
As much VGDs as SDs must often adjust the order when they encounter unanticipated 
problems along the way, because the order itself evolves constantly over time and with the 
opportunities that arise as the product takes shape. To reduce this uncertainty, they are 
always checking and frequently fine-tuning planning and WBS targets, which serve as 
regular reminders that their decision-making latitude begins where that of the client and 
project manager ends (Hodgson, 2004, p. 87). 
In fact, if the client refuses to extend the project and the deadline, but makes extra demands, 
he is actually requiring extended working hours. As projects frequently overlap, employees 
juggle heavy parallel demands and set priorities themselves in the case of conflicting tasks, 
while possibly facing reprimands for the decisions they make. Instructions such as “Do 
whatever it takes to meet this deadline” or “Here’s the objective, make sure you meet it” are 
inputs into autonomous decision making. The respondents’ expressions on this last point are 
eloquent: “a customer-centered approach,” “having the creativity to stay competitive on the 
market,” “always say yes, take everything on,” and “honour your commitments.” In fact, like 
European project team workers, VGDs and SDs use the language of entrepreneurs 
(Lindgren and Packendorff, 2006, p. 859). They are encouraged to devote the “time it takes,” 
rather than a fixed number of hours to their work, more like entrepreneurs than wage 
earners. They are left to judge what that meant, but the project manager, the client, and their 
colleagues monitor and evaluate their performance.  
When costs are being cut, the workload can exceed what workers can do within the 
allocated time if organizations do not hire enough people (Aronsson, 1999).  
In the face of such sizeable risks, the optimal solution is often to attempt to do it all, which 
results in unlimited overtime (Chasserio & Legault, 2005, 2009; Legault, 2005; Legault & 
Bellemare, 2008; Watts, 2009). To stick to the agreed-upon price, production costs, the main 
component of which is labour, must be lowered. Thus UUO is a major asset, commonly 
throughout PM environments (Lindgren & Packendorff, 2006, p. 858-9). 
Since timetables and budgets are always narrowly defined, total commitment is often 
required from all project participants, implying long hours and a willingness to work even 
weekends on short notice (as also shown by Watts, 2009). PM often means improvising in 
order to deliver the project as planned, and in core PM theory and practice, employees are 
the ones to improvise, because each project, by design, is a temporary exception, a state of 
emergency where normal rules do not apply. Total commitment is rationalized by the fact 
that it is only for a short period, but team members work on one project after another all the 
time. In the experience of employees, the requirement to do overtime is so clear that it helps 
decide who is laid off. 
As a result, PM is popular well beyond the bounds of IT sector (Ekstedt, Lundin, Söderholm, 
& Wirdenius, 1999), and some feel we are attending a “projectification” of society (Cicmil and 
Hodgson, 2006; Maylor, Brady, Cooke-Davies & Hodgson, 2006). PM offers creative 
industries resources that seem all the more promising because they are developing as both 
practices and an academic body of knowledge (PMBoK) (Hodgson, 2002; 2004; Hobday, 
2000, p. 871). With such appealing promise, there has been a staggering increase in the 
number of members of the PM profession (Hodgson, 2004, p. 85-6). For instance, the 
Project Management Institute (PMI) now counts more than one million members and points 
out that “as the number of projects swell, the pool of credentialed talent is not keeping pace. 
In the Persian Gulf and China Sea regions alone [...] a shortage of 6 million skilled project 
professionals is expected by 2013” (PMI, 2011). So PM is very likely here to stay.  
Is UUO inherent in PM? First, overtime per se must be distinguished from unpaid overtime. 
While the uncertainty of the development process may explain why overtime is required, to a 
varying and always debatable degree, not paying for it is a managerial decision. The three 
sides of the iron triangle are inescapable, as is the imperative to produce a hit game. If 
resources are limited, the only option is overtime. Any flexibility in the schedule, unlike the 
idealized image, depends on people’s willingness to work longer hours when the iron triangle 
becomes too tight: 
The discourse of flexibility appeared not to capture well the experiences of most portfolio 
workers trying to build a career in new media – it is, as Diane Perrons (1999) has noted, 
a flexible discourse of flexibility. For example, the notion of ‘flexible hours’ suggests that 
the individual is able to exercise some control over when and how long she works; in fact 
the needs of the project were always paramount, and ‘flexibility’ was determined by 
these, rather than by the needs of the worker. Many projects had extremely tight 
deadlines (which workers had to agree to meet in order to get the contract) and these 
necessitated intense round-the-clock working for a short period, which might then be 
followed by several weeks with no (new media) work at all (Gill, 2002, p. 83-4).  
Some studios avoid overtime or pay workers for it though, although at straight-time rates. It 
is also possible to develop policies that penalize clients for changes requested once a 
project is under way, but only 16% of respondents to the IGDA survey reported working for a 
studio that did so. Teams have to accept new requests. But, with or without new requests, 
teams are rarely big enough, deadlines are rarely reasonable and budgets stay pretty much 
the same (IGDA, 2004, pp. 19–20).  
But we previously left pending an important question: While overtime is not wholly 
compensated, in violation of the applicable statutory framework, how do employers get these 
(in some respects) unhappy workers to work so many hours of unpaid overtime? The great 
willingness of aware and sought-after experts to work overtime for free seems paradoxical, 
so how is it fostered? Here follows a sketch of the model developed for VGDs but relevant to 
SDs as well (Legault & Ouellet, 2012).  
How workers are induced to work unpaid overtime 
VGDs and SDs are not part of a large pool of replaceable labour; on the contrary, they are a 
strategic factor in their employer’s success in a volatile, competitive market for innovative 
customized products. To employers, their skills are of even greater strategic importance 
because the demand exceeds supply, resulting in a shortage of skilled labour in these two IT 
subsectors, as is the case in Quebec (Corbeil, 2011, pp. 8 and 44–45). Their in-demand 
skills are of even greater strategic importance to employees, indeed are their primary asset 
in the endless search for work, because the job market is shaped by just a handful of 
organizations.  
As industry employers invest a great deal in recruiting experts who are in such short supply, 
the trend toward more unpaid overtime cannot be explained by the pressure of unemployed 
workers triggering competition on the job market, as some analysts maintain occurs in other 
fields of employment (Aronsson, 1999). Hence the question: If designers are not paid for 
working overtime, why are they so willing to do it? 
A common explanation in the VGD milieu is that designers just love games, and are often 
big fans, members of associations, former testers, gamers or modders. Even if many 
designers do love games, that cannot explain all the voluntary UUO in the industry and 
among our respondents, since many of them decry the practice (IGDA, 2004, pp. 16–18). In 
an IGDA survey of its members, 61.5% of respondents felt it would be hard to keep up the 
same pace of work because the long hours could have repercussions on their lives outside 
work, mainly with friends and family (IGDA, 2004, p. 18). Many designers are contesting this 
practice by taking a two-pronged approach of, on the one hand, class actions (mostly in the 
United States), and, on the other, monitoring overtime management in studios around the 
world, compiled on the Gamewatch Web site, with data supplied by the simple but constant 
vigilance of designers in the industry (Legault & Weststar, 201*). At the same time, love of 
games is a powerful force that employers can use as part of a more complex system of 
punishments and rewards to induce people to work unpaid overtime voluntarily. Moreover, 
that cannot and is not either said of SDs.  
I have offered an analysis (Legault & Ouellet, 2012) based on the importance of reputation 
for the mobility so essential in this industry of boundaryless careers (Arthur & Rousseau, 
1996). The resulting model applies to SDs although, in their case, the importance of their 
direct relationship with the customer must be emphasized, but does not alter the operational 
logic.  
To understand work in the IT industry, we must look closely at PM as the key factor because 
mobility is inherent in this mode of organization, with the end of every project setting off a 
new round of job seeking and recruiting. The premise of the model is the great mobility 
typical of the PM mode of organization, in which the workforce is hired for short periods, 
often on term contracts. As a result, a constant placement process goes on, in which 
reputation and portfolio play a decisive role because every placement involves a perfomance 
appraisal, and the next contract depends on the applicant’s value on the market at a specific 
moment in time.  
According to Reed (1996), for instance, IT experts are part of the “new professionals” in the 
knowledge work that is “entrepreneurial professions”, without any State regulation or buffer 
against market movements, regulated by the social network and drawing individual 
bargaining power from a competitive edge.  
In this context, workers try to put together impressive portfolios. Workers act as though they 
have fee-for-services contracts, based on deliverables, although they are actually paid on an 
hourly basis. In fact, they are rated according to results, but paid by the hour for an artificially 
fixed regular workweek:  
The study raises the question of whether the amount of unpaid overtime worked, also 
indicated deeper changes in the nature of work. An increasing group of white-collar 
workers are working as if they were on result-based contracts, while in fact they are both 
employed and remunerated on the basis of time worked. (Aronsson,1999) 
PM fosters confusion between the two types of contracts; although project team members 
are often hourly paid employees, in the world of projects, designers’ merit is deduced from 
bare results.  
Essentially, the system works like this. Aside from partial compensation in the form of 
bonuses and time off in lieu, willingness to work overtime brings with it many considerable 
benefits in the industry: inclusion in the informal peer network, which is very important for 
mobility; a good performance appraisal, which may itself lead to a pay increase, as well as a 
good reputation; in turn, a good reputation facilitates promotion, assignment to the most 
prestigious projects and mobility, which is coveted in the industry because it provides 
opportunities to learn about advanced technologies. Above all, a good reputation is an 
individual designer’s trump card in negotiating a pay raise. Mobility thus enhances 
reputation, and with both driving a system that has an implacable internal logic and a 
powerful ripple effect.  
The system is just as effective in punishing those designers unwilling to work overtime: they 
will not be rewarded, even if the game is a success and they have contributed to it; they are 
denied the main benefits of the informal peer network, which will not recommend them for 
prestigious projects, and thus they will not be exposed to the most advanced technology; 
they will not be as well rated nor as well paid as their peers; their portfolios will suffer 
because they do not enjoy the kind of reputation that facilitates mobility. In essence, they are 
pretty well stuck where they are. 
Mobility is a crucial factor in people’s willingness to do overtime because the greater their 
desire for vertical mobility (line management positions, prestigious projects) or horizontal 
mobility (other studios, other countries), the more vulnerable they are to the system of 
rewards and punishments. Conversely, designers who place great importance on family life, 
or who have been sick, often revise their priorities and aim for less strategic positions in the 
industry, less out on the leading edge, but that allow them to reconcile professional and 
personal goals.  
Designers are induced by this kind of system to work a great deal of overtime, since most 
agree to do it despite the disadvantages and their dissatisfaction. On the one hand, the 
industry has its own star system, a worldwide meritocracy, which cranks up the pressure to 
earn a reputation. On the other, collective action could offer protection against this 
requirement, but experts’ mobility sets up a significant hurdle in the North American 
enterprise-based certification process (Legault & Weststar, 201*).  
Neither purely voluntary and freely agreed to, nor required and forced, overtime comes 
under the broad category of “voluntary but expected” working hours (Campbell, 2002:141).  
Alternatives to overtime are not up for discussion, and a number of conditions reduce the 
range of foreseeable scenarios for designers who, like many creative workers, would like to 
move around in the industry (Florida, 2005) and hope to work on prestigious games. There is 
still a demand to respect their personal lives and allow them time for personal development, 
but it runs up against those constraints.  
As an end result, the drive towards getting a reputation overrides the employer’s direct 
control and insures workers’ collaboration. Project managers generally succeed in getting 
SDs and VGDs to work in UUO in spite of legal constraints, dissatisfaction of workers and a 
high level of awareness of this problem.  
CONCLUSION 
IT sector in general, and videogames and B2BTS in particular, are experiencing a high level 
of risk on an international competitive product market wherein constant innovation is 
strategically important. To deal with such an uncertainty level, venture capital involved lies 
on important conditions: easy international mobility and plans of risk transfer down the value 
chain. Immediately lower down the chain, studios in VG sector or consulting firms in SDS are 
conveyed this risk to deal with. The three components of the iron triangle are three strikes 
against planning as well as risky issues for this intermediate actor: neither the scope of the 
unique product or time required can be foreseen, however they both will affect the amount of 
labour required, which is the utmost cost. Employers then manage this risk in sharing it with 
experts they hire, as the main source of cost. PM is a performing device to do so.  
The risk inherent to IT venture, that could be a paramount concern for shareholders, is first 
transferred on studios or B2BTS firms’ managers, who must assume the risk inherent to R-D 
and manage the creation process. They in turn transfer it to workers who are the ones to 
bear this risk in working UUO. As labour is the utmost cost, by doing so they avoid too big 
fluctuations and UUO thus acts as a buffer against financial risk. In the process, workers 
suffer related health problems and people who enjoy or need private time, particularly 
mothers of young, desert these two fields (Chasserio & Legault, 2005, 2010; Legault & 
Chasserio, 2012). Up until now, collective action and labour market institutions show poor 
regulating power to act as a buffer, partly due to high mobility, national as well as 
international, at odds with North American enterprise-based certification process. SDs are 
not organised at all, while VGDs set forward original means of informal collective action 2.0 
(Legault & Weststar, 201*). 
Assuming that overtime is necessary, the fact that it is unpaid is a great boon to 
shareholders. In the industry, the risk of missing a project deadline (for example, the 
September deadline for selling the game for Christmas) is the main risk—and the main 
source of uncertainty. Unpaid overtime keeps labour costs down to what was planned at the 
outset, and because labour represents by far the biggest cost, the project can be kept within 
budget. The cost of the risk is passed on to the designers, who assume it, paying with lost 
leisure time, health problems and lack of earnings (Burke & Fiksenbaum, 2009; Legault & 
Belarbi-Basbous, 2006). If the game is a hit, they will get to share in it through bonuses and 
time off in lieu. But if it is a flop, they are the ones who bear all the costs of the risk though 
foregone earnings and the adverse effects of overwork. 
Project-based organization, in an economical context of high competition over an 
international product market, has many consequences, including: high management 
expectations of employee flexibility to meet unanticipated client demands, long working 
hours with fierce resistance to any reduction and UUO as an end result.  
As the job market is based on reputation, experts don’t develop commitment to any 
employer but rather commit to the trade and are highly mobile, either world-wide, as among 
VGDs, or nation-wide, as seen most often in SDs.  
As en end-result, there’s an emerging workplace regulation model among the highly qualified 
workers of IT, stemming from combined IT firms’ risk management strategy and PM as an 
organisation mode, closely tied to the high international mobility of venture capital, upstream, 
and to the high international mobility of workforce, downstream.  
Bien qu’ancienne, la gestion par projets connaît un essor qui explique la 
profondeur des changements qui surviennent dans l’organisation du travail 
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